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Abstract 
Kenya is often considered as one of the fastest growing economies in Africa. This is mainly as result of its open 
economy encouraging foreign investment and its strategic location of the Mombasa Sea Port in Kenya which is 
usually used as a gate way to conducting international trade with other landlocked countries in East and 
Central Africa. Indeed, it is for this reason that China has identified Mombasa as one of the key maritime ports 
in the Chinese ‘One Belt One Road’ project and as a result China has heavily invested in Kenya.1  
The growth of international trade in Kenya has resulted to a rise international arbitration practice in Kenya to 
resolve commercial disputes. To this end, this article examines the state of international arbitration practice in 
Kenya. It does this by firstly examining the arbitration legal framework in Kenya. Then, it identifies the 
international arbitration practice in Kenya using results from a survey questionnaire administered to the key 
users and stakeholders of international arbitration in Kenya. The article also analyses the role of the Kenyan 
courts in the enforcement of international arbitration agreements by using stay of proceedings, anti-suit 
injunctions and judicial approach of arbitration of mandatory laws in Kenya. These issues are analysed 
comparatively throughout with mainly reference to English Law.  
Legal Framework of International Arbitration in Kenya 
The earliest arbitration law in Kenya was the Arbitration Ordinance 1914, which was a reproduction of the 
English Arbitration Act of 1889. The Arbitration Ordinance 1914 was basically being used in resolution of 
commercial disputes as an alternative to litigation, which gave the Kenyan national courts ultimate control 
over the arbitration procedures.  
However, with the development of trade and the acceleration of arbitration, there was a need to reform the 
law. Indeed, the first legislation of regulating arbitration in Kenya after its independence was the Arbitration 
Act 1968. This Act was modelled around the English Arbitration Act of 1950. The intention was to ensure that 
 
* Dr Margaret Liu (corresponding author) is an Assistant Professor in law at Coventry Law School, United 
Kingdom. David Mwoni Ndolo is currently a PhD Student at Coventry University. 
1 For more on this see Herbling D and Li D ‘China’s Built a Railroad to Nowhere in Kenya’ Bloomberg July 19 
2019 available online at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-07-19/china-s-belt-and-road-
leaves-kenya-with-a-railroad-to-nowhere. Last accessed 03/10/2019. 
 
 
arbitration proceedings were more insulated from court interventions that were afforded by the Arbitration 
Ordinance 1914, which was having effect on the effectiveness and efficiency on arbitration as alternative 
dispute resolution method.2 
However, one of the main criticisms of the Arbitration Act 1968, was that it did not limit the extent to which 
the Kenyan national courts could intervene in the arbitration procedure. This affected the efficiency, 
expediency and effectiveness of arbitration because there were delays, additional procedures and costs in 
arbitration proceedings as references to made to national courts were frequent and often defeated the 
purpose of arbitration as alternative ADR mechanism.3 The above assertion was highlighted at the Kenyan 
Court of Appeal in Nyutu Agrovet Limited v Airtel Networks Ltd4 where Justice Karanja held that: 
‘The [Arbitration] Act [1958] provided too much intrusive powers to the courts to interfere with 
arbitral proceedings and the awards. This was contrary to the intention of the traders who intended 
that arbitration should be unfettered from the courts’ intricate legal procedures which hampered 
efficiency in dispute resolution and resultantly slowed down growth in trade.’5 
As a result, there was need to modernise the Kenyan laws on arbitration to keep up with international 
standards with a specific intention to reduce national court’s influence in arbitration. To achieve this, Kenya in 
1989 acceded to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 1958 
(hereinafter New York Convention 1958). In addition to this Kenya then adopted the UNICITRAL Model 
arbitration law which led to the legal reforms repealing the Arbitration Act 1968 Act replacing it with the 
current legislation governing arbitration in Kenya, the Arbitration Act 1995 (hereinafter AA1995) and the 
Arbitration Rules 1997 (hereinafter AR1997) therein. In essence therefore, AA 1995 is based on the UNICITRAL 
Model which as mentioned above, was put in place with the aim of harmonizing national arbitration laws and 
to assist states in reforming and modernizing their national arbitration laws and procedure to ensure they 
apply the fundamental features and the requirements of international commercial arbitration, particularly on 
the limitation of the court interference with the arbitration proceedings. Currently, the AA 1995 and AR 1997 
have been amended via the Arbitration (Amendment) Act 2010 which was assented to on 1st January 2010 
(hereinafter the Amendment Act). The Amendment Act widens the scope of the AA 1995 beyond the 
UNICITRAL Model Law to reflect the modern international practices of arbitration, for instance, s. 16 and s. 32 
of the Amendment Act amend the general duties of the parties to ensure proper and expeditious arbitration 
proceedings as well as amending the rules on cost and expenses of arbitration. It is worth mentioning that the 
Amendment Act 2010 only amends certain sections of the AA 1995 as illustrated in s. 16 and s. 32 of the 
Amendment Act. Therefore, the AA 1995 remains valid law.  
 
2 Karega M and Abdallah A Kenya The International Arbitration Review (9th ed. Law Business Research 2018) at 
page 283. 
3 Githu Muigai & Jacqueline Kamau ‘The Legal Framework of Arbitration in Kenya’ at page 1 (chapter 1 of 
Muigai G Arbitration Law and Practice in Kenya (Law Africa, 2013)). 




The essence of the AA 1995 as amended by the Amendment Act is to govern all international or domestic 
arbitration in Kenya.6 Therefore, to a large extend, the Act provides the default position in many respects of 
the arbitration process, for instance, if parties in an arbitration agreement have not provided the number of 
arbitrators, then the Act in s.11 provides that the presumption is that the parties intended for one arbitrator.7 
In doing this the Act gives liberty to decide for themselves in the arbitration agreement their desired 
arbitration process. In respect to the court’s intervention in the arbitration s.10 of the AA 1995 (modelled from 
article 5 of the UNICITRAL Model law) limits the power of national courts to intervene in arbitration 
proceedings in matters governed by the Act except as provided in the Act such in granting stay in proceedings 
or recognition and enforcement of awards as discussed below.  
In order to promote arbitration practice and attract international trade in Kenya, the new Kenyan Constitution 
2010 was passed in which in Article 159(2)(c)8 encourages the Kenya national courts to promote arbitration. 
The Kenyan Chief Justice David Maraga claims that “The 2010 Constitution provides for alternative forms of 
dispute resolution”, which is “timely and cost-effective justice”. He further states that “Article 159(2) provides 
that in solving disputes, our courts should now promote the use of ADR.”9 This assertion finds an echo in 
Gichuhi who put in “Article 159(2)(c) of the Constitution which requires courts to be guided by the need to 
promote arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution(ADR).”10 The inclusion of this Article within the 
Kenyan Constitution is aimed at promoting arbitration in Kenya primarily because at the time, there was a 
significant backlog of cases within the Kenyan judiciary which affected the speed of dispute resolution in 
Kenya. In this way therefore arbitration is seen as a mechanism which gives a much needed offload of cases 
from the Kenyan courts thus improving the speed of dispute resolution.11 
In light of this, the Nairobi Centre for International Arbitration Act 2013 (hereinafter NCIA 2013) was passed. 
The essence of the Act is to effectively establish an independent arbitration institution that is, the Nairobi 
Centre of International Arbitration and set out its governance structure, funding and its functions.12 Under s.5 
of the NCIA 2013, the NCIA is mandated to inter alia; promote, administer, facilitate and encourage the 
 
6 S.2 AA 1995. 
7 S.11 AA 1995. 
8 Article 159(2)(c) states that “In exercising judicial authority, the courts and tribunals shall be guided by the 
following principles ….alternative forms of dispute resolution including reconciliation, mediation, arbitration 
and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms shall be promoted.” 
9 Paul Wanga, “Mediation saves time and money”, Columnists, 5 December 2017, available at the-
star.co.ke/opinion/columnist/2017-12-04-mediation-sav4es-time-and-money>  accessed 16 October 2019. 
10 John Gichuhu, “Revisiting Article 159(2)( C) of the Constitution of Kanya: How the judge sees it”, available  at 
https://www.academia.edu/37284075/John_Gichuhi_Revisiting_Article_159_2_c_of_the_Constitution_of_Ke
nya_How_the_judge_sees_it_ ,accessed 17 October 2019.  
11  Standard Media, ‘Arbitration centre in Nairobi to Reduce case Backlog’ (30th Sep 2014)  available online 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000136635/arbitration-centre-in-nairobi-to-reduce-case-
backlog/?pageNo=2. Last Accessed 17/10/19. 
See also, Business Daily, ‘Judiciary Moves to Cut Case Backlog Through Arbitrators’ July 28, 2014  
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Judiciary-moves-to-cut-case-backlog/-/539546/2400826/-/av3arqz/-
/index.html. Last Accessed 17/10/19. 
12 s.4 NCIA 2013. 
 
 
conduct of international commercial arbitration in Kenya in line with the Act.13 Inevitably the NCIA is heavily 
influence by the experiences of the more established institutions such as the the London Court of International 
Arbitration (hereinafter LCIA). Indeed the NCIA Arbitration Rules 2015 rules14 are very similar to the LCIA and 
its rules15 
The establishment of NCIA indicates a recognition by the Kenyan government of the fact that hosting 
international arbitration is not only a means to attract business but also a way to build a jurisdiction's 
reputation as a modern, neutral and reliable place to do business and respecting the rule of law. For Kenya 
specifically, attracting international arbitration in this way would significantly benefit the local legal community 
that is, the Kenyan lawyers, arbitrators and the NCIA, by increasing demand for their services.16 This is likely to 
lead to the development of Kenyan laws on arbitration as well as a much needed significant offload of cases 
from the Kenyan courts.17 
Arbitration Practice in Kenya 
In order to get better understanding of the arbitration practice in Kenya, the author conducted  an empirical 
survey both online and self-administered from June to September 2018. 
Methodology  
The survey questionnaire used for conducting this survey was modelled around the on 2015 the White and 
Case and Queen Mary Survey 2015; International Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in 
International Arbitration (QMU survey 2015).18 As a result, comparisons will be made throughout. 
The sample for this survey consisted of lawyers in law firms with either arbitration knowledge or experience in 
Nairobi, Kenya listed in the Kenyan Yellow pages. This sample has chosen for three main reasons. Firstly, and 
perhaps most importantly, the survey questionnaire aimed at getting arbitration practice in Kenya and thus 
 
13 s.5 NCIA 2013. 
14 NCIA Arbitration 2015 Rules available at https://ncia.or.ke/wp-
content/uploads/2019/02/arbitration_rules_2016.pdf. Last accessed 23/10/19. 
15Laura Lusiji, Patricia Njeru and John Miles ‘The landscape of international arbitration in Kenya’ (02 October 
2018) available online at http://www.inhouselawyer.co.uk/legal-briefing/the-landscape-of-international-
arbitration-in-kenya/. Last accessed 23/10/19. 
16 Ibid. 
17  Standard Media, ‘Arbitration centre in Nairobi to Reduce case Backlog’ (30th Sep 2014), available online 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000136635/arbitration-centre-in-nairobi-to-reduce-case-
backlog/?pageNo=2. Last Accessed 17/10/19. 
See also, Business Daily, ‘Judiciary Moves to Cut Case Backlog Through Arbitrators’ July 28, 2014  
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Judiciary-moves-to-cut-case-backlog/-/539546/2400826/-/av3arqz/-
/index.html. Last Accessed 17/10/19. 
18 Thanks to Rutger Metsch, Research Fellow in International Arbitration at White Case Law Firm and at Queen 
Mary University for supplying for providing the original questionnaire for the 2015, International Arbitration 
Survey on Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration for which the set questions for that this 
survey questionnaires  were used to create some of the questions for this survey. The findings of this survey is 





the nature of questions asked involved required legal or arbitration experience knowledge and/or experience 
so as to provide reliable and credible responses. 
Secondly, this sample is consistent with previous surveys. For instance, the respondents for QMU Survey 2015 
were either, arbitrators, private practitioners, general counsel or heads of legal departments or counsel acting 
on the authority of the general counsel (lawyers).19 For the World Intellectual Property Organization’s 2013 
Survey, the respondents were either self-employed or working at law firms or companies or research 
organizations or universities or government bodies.20 For the Berwin Leighton Paisner Survey 2016, the 
respondents were arbitrators, corporate counsel, external lawyers, users of arbitration and those working at 
arbitral institutions.21 Similarly, the Polish Arbitration survey 2016, respondents were lawyers working at law 
firms, business managers and in-house lawyers.22 Therefore, the main consistent theme from the previous 
survey respondents is that they included respondents that have a legal background or/and in law firms.  
Thirdly as explained below the samples takes into account the cost and time constrains. The author was 
conducting the online phase from 1st June 2018- 2nd September 2018 via online surveys and the self-
administered questionnaires only on working days for period of just over calendar month that is, from late 24th 
July 2018 up until 2nd September 2018. In relation to cost, due to the allocated budget it would be 
impracticable to travel from Nairobi to other cities in Kenya. Therefore, the advantage of this sample is that it 
provides an opportunity to make the most of the large but manageable size of the respondents as well as the 
available time and budget.23  
The majority of the questions for the survey questionnaires were closed ended questions and this were all in 
added to the survey online, via online survey which then analysed the data and produced the data graphs used 
below. For open ended questions were also used to illicit more information from the respondents and also 
give room for unusual responses including personal views which enrich the research findings. The responses 
given in the closed ended questions were coded and divided into similar themes and subthemes to compare 
and analyse them with main aim of mapping the main issues. 
The choice of Nairobi, Kenya makes this project unique. This is because even though there are other previous 
surveys as mentioned above which focused on the views of a particular group of actors within international 
arbitration, this survey is the first to primarily focus on respondents based in Nairobi, Kenya on arbitration 
practices and their views on anti-suit injunctions in the arbitration context. 
 
19 Ibid at at page 24. 
20 World Intellectual Property Organization Arbitration and Mediation Centre ‘International Survey on Dispute 
Resolution in Technology Transactions’ (2013) at Page 9 available online 
https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/amc/en/docs/surveyresults.pdf. Last accessed 29/10/2019. 
21 Burford ‘Judgment Enforcement Survey’ (2016) available online at http://www.burfordcapital.com/2016-
judgment-enforcement-research-survey/(last accessed 23/10/2019) at page 1 
22 Kocur & Partners ‘Polish Arbitration Survey’ (2016) available online at http://kocurpartners.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Polish-Arbitration-Survey-2016-eng-2.pdf (last accessed 23/10/2019) 
23 Etikan I, Abubakar S, Alkassim R.S. ‘Comparison of Convenience Sampling and Purposive Sampling’ (2016) 
5(1) American Journal of Theoretical and Applied Statistics 1-4, at 2. 
 
 
In relation to population representation, it should be noted that, a simple search for ‘lawyers’ on 1st June 2018, 
on the Yellow pages revealed 252 law firm results. A similar search on the same date but specifically for 
‘lawyers’ in Nairobi, Kenya revealed 235 law firms results and this therefore formed the defined sample 
population.24 From these results therefore, the defined sample population formed an overwhelming majority 
of the law firms in Kenya, 93.3%. 
The typical response rate of a self-administered survey questionnaire is between 50-70 percent while that of 
an online survey is between 30-50 percent.25 In order to gain the response rate for this survey questionnaire 
this project will use the following formula; (least variable percentage for self-administered questionnaire 50 
plus the percentage of the least variable for the online survey 30) ÷ 2 = 40 percent.26 Therefore, the targeted 
response rate for this questionnaire was at least 40 percent of 235 which is at least 94 respondents. 
Incredibly, there were a total of 144 responses which means these findings are from over 61% of targeted 
sample. 94% of these respondents’ primary role was legal while the other 6% primary role varied including 
banking and health care. 
Most favourable characteristic of arbitration in Kenya 
In the survey questionnaire the respondents were asked to identify the most valuable characteristic of 
international arbitration. The survey question is captured on top with different aspects. The numbers in bold 
indicates number of respondents who chose that option while the percentage out of the 144 respondents is 
indicated in brackets. 
 
24 The relevant website is https://yellow.co.ke/search/?q=lawyer&l=nairobi&page=5. 
25 Bryman A Business Research Methods (2015) see also Ilieva J, Baron S and Healey N ‘Online Surveys in 
Marketing Research: Pros and Cons’ (2003) 44(3) International Journal of Market Research 361, at 364. 




The three most selected characteristics were: Firstly confidentiality and privacy 54.2%. Privacy in this context 
means that no third party can attend arbitral process while confidentiality means that parties have the 
advantage of non-disclosure of specific information about the dispute in public.27 Therefore it is unsurprising 
that settling disputes via international arbitration is considered by many as an effective way to private business 
practices, trade secrets, industrial processes, intellectual property, as well as proceedings with a possible 
negative impact on the business, private and confidential.  
Secondly, avoiding specific legal systems/national courts 43.8% and thirdly speed 41.7%. This result reinforces 
the continued prodigious success of the New York Convention 1958 generally to which the main aim is to 
promote arbitration as alternative resolution mechanism and to promote enforceability of arbitral awards.  
In comparison to the QMU 2015 survey, when the parties where asked the same question, the respondents 
indicated as below.28 
 
27 Barkett J.M, Cruz-Alvarez F, Pagliery S ‘Perspectives on the New York Convention under the Laws of the United States 
Forum Non Convenience as a Stopper to Enforcement’ (August 17, 2016) Kluwer Arbitration Blog. Available online at 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/08/17/perspectives-new-york-convention-laws-united-states-forum-
non-conveniens-stopper-enforcement/.Last accessed 23/10/2019. 




It is notable that the avoidance of the of the specific legal systems/national courts is highly ranked in both 
surveys. However, it is surprising to see that with speed was confidentially and privacy was highly ranked in the 
Kenya survey (54.2%) and not as much in the QMU (33%). But perhaps this neatly illustrates main differences 
on the purposes why parties seek arbitration in Kenya which includes confidentiality and privacy as discussed 
above and speed of dispute resolution. Speed of dispute resolution is a significant issue in Kenya because there 
is significant backlog of cases within the Kenyan Judiciary which slows down dispute resolution.29 Indeed it is 
the main reasons why the Article 159 of the constitution of Kenya was introduced to mandate courts to 
promote arbitration and other ADR so as to offload of cases from the Kenyan courts and to increase the speed 
of dispute resolution in Kenya.  
Most preferred seat of arbitration in Kenya 
With regards to the most preferred arbitration institution, Nairobi Centre of the International Arbitration 
(NCIA) is the most preferred arbitration institution among the respondents to the survey (see below). 
However, since the NCIA was recently established, it can be inferred that NCIA was the most preferred seat in 
this survey because its geographical location is particular advantageous to the targeted respondents who were 
all based in Kenya. Indeed, majority of the respondents indicated that the NCIA needs to do more public 
awareness campaigns and advertisements of its services and of promoting arbitration in Kenya.  
This is followed by the two of the most used arbitration institutions internationally, the London Centre of 
International Arbitration (Hereinafter LCIA) and the International Chamber of Commerce (hereinafter ICC). 
Usually preferences are given to these seats primarily because of their general reputation for neutrality and 
 
29 Standard Media, ‘Arbitration centre in Nairobi to Reduce case Backlog’ (30th Sep 2014)  available online 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000136635/arbitration-centre-in-nairobi-to-reduce-case-
backlog/?pageNo=2. Last Accessed 17/10/19. 
 
 
impartiality of its national laws and legal system as well as the track record of their national courts of 
recognising and enforcing arbitration agreements and awards.30 
 
 
In comparison to the QMU 2015 survey, when the parties were asked the same question, the respondents 
indicated as below.31 
 
30 See Queen Mary University and White & Case International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International 
Arbitration 2018, at page 9. 





There appears to be a fairly similar result but on selection of seats with no surprise on LCIA and the ICC in Paris 
being highly ranked in both survey. From the QMU 2015 survey, reasons why the respondents selected these 
seats include neutrality and impartiality of the local legal system, the national arbitration law and judicial track 
record for enforcing agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards.32 
It can be inferred that NCIA was the most preferred seat in the Kenyan Survey, because its geographical 
location is particular advantageous (easily accessible and cost saving) and to the targeted respondent who 
were all based in Kenya. However, if this was the only reasoning the respondents used when selecting the 
NCIA then it should have followed that Kigali Centre of International Arbitration would have been among the 
most preferred arbitral institution in the Kenyan survey. In this regard therefore, further research should be 
conducted in order to understand why the parties choose these particular institutions 
 
Selection of arbitrators in Kenya 
In relation to the selection of arbitrators, arbitration experience and reputation of impartiality as well as the 
competence in the sector that dispute concerns are the three most important characteristics the respondents 
look for when appointing an arbitrator (see below). A significant number of respondents also indicated the 
arbitrator’s cost is one of the main considerations when selecting an arbitrator. The least important 
characteristic that the respondents consider when selecting an arbitrator is the personal experience with the 
arbitrator (6.3%), the academic achievement and title (13.9%) as well as the general legal experience (5.6%) as 
demonstrated in the table below. 
 





Role of the courts in Arbitration 
As mentioned above, s. 10 of AA 1995 limits the power of Kenyan courts to interfere with the arbitration 
process unless provided for in the Act. The limited circumstances to which the Kenyan national courts can now 
interfere with arbitration via Arbitration Act 1995 is aimed at, supporting, complementing and supervising the 
arbitration process as well as protecting Kenyan public policy. So for instance, s.6 of the AA 1995 confers the 
High Court powers to stay legal proceedings and refer the matter to arbitration where there is pre-existing 
agreement to refer the matter for arbitration. Moreover, s.11 & 12 of the AA 1995 confers the High Court the 
power to determine the number of arbitrators and appoint them if the parties fail to do so. Section 28 of the 
AA 1995 provides that the arbitral tribunal, or a party with the approval of the arbitral tribunal, may request 
from the High Court assistance in taking evidence, and the High Court may execute the request within its 
competence and according to its rules on taking evidence. Importantly, s.35 AA 1995 gives the High Court 
power to set aside arbitration award where ‘the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the law of Kenya’ or the award is in ‘conflict with the public policy of Kenya.’ 
 
 
This role of the courts of complementing, supporting and supervising arbitration was confirmed in Sadrudin 
Kurji & another v Shalimar Limited & 2 others33 where the court held:  
‘arbitration process as provided by the Arbitration Act (1995) is intended to facilitate a quicker method 
of settling disputes without undue regard to technicalities. This, however, does not mean that the 
Courts will stand and watch helplessly where cardinal rules of natural justice are being breached by 
the process of arbitration. Hence, in exceptional cases in which the rules are not adhered to, the courts 
will be perfectly entitled to step in and correct obvious errors.’34  
 
Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements 
An agreement to arbitrate is the founding stone of international arbitration as it records the parties consent to 
arbitrate in a binding manner that mandates the arbitrator or the arbitral tribunal to decide the dispute that is 
covered in that agreement.35 In addition to this arbitration agreement will usually include inter alia, the scope 
of the agreement, the arbitral seat, choice of law, arbitration rules and number of arbitrators.36 There are two 
types of arbitration agreements, the arbitration clause and the submission agreement. The arbitration clause 
relates to an agreement between the parties which is usually in form of the clause in the underlying contract 
to submit future disputes to arbitration.37 The submission agreement refers to an agreement which the parties 
agree to submit an existing dispute to arbitration.38 In Kenya, s.3 of the AA 1995 defines an arbitration 
agreement as an agreement ‘by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or 
which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.’ 
Therefore an arbitration agreement as enshrined in section 3 is a binding undertaking by which the parties 
agree to settle disputes by way of arbitration rather than proceedings in court.39 
With regards to the formality s.4(2) of the AA 1995 requires an arbitration agreement to be ‘in writing.’ This 
requirement is satisfied if an arbitration agreement is contained in either a document signed by the parties or 
an exchange of letters, telex, telegram, fax, electronic mail or other areas of telecommunications which 
provide a record of the agreement or an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the existence 
of an agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other.40 This means therefore, an agreement 
can either be in the form of a clause within the underlying contract or in separate document.41  
With regards to the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements the Kenya courts have a 
developed positive attitude promoting arbitration in Kenya particularly following the Constitutional 
 
33 [2006] eKLR. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Blackaby N, Partrasides C, Redfern A and Hunter M Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (6th ed. OUP 2015), 
at page 92. 
36 Born G International Arbitration Law and Practice (2nd ed. Wolters Kluwer 2016), at page 35. 
37 Redfern & Hunter on International Arbitration, OUP, p 72. 
38 Ibid. 
39 William Lonana Shena v. HJE Medical Research International Inc Case No. 1096 of 2010. 
40 S.4(3) AA 1995. 
41 S.4(1) AA 1995. 
 
 
underpinnings under Article 159 of the Constitution of Kenya discussed above. This is confirmed by Judge 
Gikoyo in Bellevue Development Company Limited v Vinayak Builders Limited & another42 in the Kenya High 
Court where he held that: 
‘Article 159 of the Constitution of Kenya enjoins the Courts and all tribunals to support and encourage 
parties to promote Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (ADR) including Arbitration. This Court 
is thereby enjoined to breathe life into an Arbitration agreement to give effect to the intentions of the 
contracting parties who freely choose the said mode of dispute resolution in a private contract so as to 
take advantage of the trilogy of benefits which are said to be attendant to Arbitration.’43  
 
Doctrine of Separability 
As mentioned above the separability of the arbitration agreement is fundamental to the arbitration process in 
a way that the arbitration clause or contract is treated as separate from the underlying contract.  
The doctrine of separability operates in a way to ensure that the arbitration agreement although contained 
and closely related to the underlying contract is separable or severable from the underlying contract. In this 
way therefore, the arbitration agreement is a separate and autonomous contract.44  
This doctrine is recognised internationally. In the UK s.7 of the Arbitration Act 1996 states that unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties,’ an arbitration agreement which forms or was intended to form part of 
another agreement whether or not in writing… shall be treated as a distinct agreement.’ This has also been 
recognised in the UK courts as Lord Steyn held in Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v Impregilo SpA45  
‘It is part of the very alphabet of arbitration law, as… spelled out in section 7 of the Act (AA 1996), that 
the arbitration agreement is a distinct and separable agreement from the underlying or principal 
contract.’46 
In the US, although it is not expressly mentioned in the Federal Arbitration Act 1925 (hereinafter FAA 1925), 
the US Supreme Court has interpreted s.4 of the FAA 1925 which mandates US courts to enforce arbitration 
agreement to include the separability doctrine.47 The US Supreme in Prima Paint Corp. v Flood & Conklin48 held 
that: 
‘Arbitration clauses as a matter of federal law are ‘separable’ from the contracts in which they are 
embedded, and that where no claim is made that fraud was directed to the arbitration clause itself, a 
 
42 Civil Case No. 571 of 2011, [2014] eKLR. 
43 Ibid., para 29. 
44 Chaturvedi S and Agrawal C ‘Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction’ (2011) 77(2) Arbitration 201-210, at 202 
45 [2005] UKHL 43. 
46 Ibid. Lord Steyn, at para 21. 




broad arbitration clause will be held to encompass arbitration of the claim that the contract itself was 
induced by fraud.’49 
The main practical purpose of the separability doctrine is to protect the parties’ chosen dispute resolution 
method and arbitrator’s jurisdiction even if it is alleged that the underlying contract may be invalid.50 For 
instance, in Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov51 Fiona had purported to rescind the underlying contract on 
the basis it believed to have been procured through bribery and it argued as result of this the arbitration 
clause contained in it was not binding. The UK House of Lords held that, the arbitration agreement had to be 
treated as a distinct agreement and could be void or voidable only on grounds which related directly to it. 
Therefore, Fiona’s argument was dismissed because the arbitration agreement was valid and thus it was for 
the arbitrators to determine if the underlying contract was void as a result of bribery.  
In Kenya the separability of the arbitration agreement is captured in s.17 of the AA 1995 which states that an 
arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other 
terms of the contract, and a decision by the arbitral tribunal that the (underlying) contract is null and void shall 
not itself invalidate the arbitration clause.52  
Kenya Airports Parking Services Ltd & Another v Municipal Council of Mombasa53 is a case in point where, the 
principle of separability of an arbitration agreement was given a ‘judicial stamp of approval’ and is applicable 
even where one of the parties is challenging the validity or illegality of the agreement itself.54  
The Kenyan courts approach therefore, reflects the international standards of interpretation of the doctrine of 
separability in such a way any challenges to the underlying contract does not invalidate the arbitration 
agreement. 
 
Doctrine of competence-competence 
The Kenyan courts recognise the principle of competence-competence that is the arbitrator’s or arbitral 
tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide disputes over its own jurisdiction.55 The competence-competence principle was 
reinforced in Adopt the Light v Magnate Venture Ltd and 3 others56 where R.S.C. Omolo of the Kenyan Court of 
Appeal held that:  
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‘It is clear under the Section (S.17 AA 1995) that an arbitrator has the power to rule on the issue of his 
own jurisdiction and the validity or otherwise of the agreement, the subject of the arbitration and may 
even rule that contract is null and void.’57 
Interestingly, Nyamu J.A. held in the Kenyan Court of Appeal in Safaricom Limited v Ocean View Beach Hotel 
Limited58 that:  
‘The Section (s.17 AA 1995) gives an arbitral tribunal the power to rule on its own jurisdiction and also 
to deal with the subject matter of the arbitration. It is not the function of a national Court to rule on 
the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal except by way of appeal under Section 17 (6) of the Arbitration 
Act.’59  
The Kenyan court’s broad approach on competence-competence is consistent with English courts approach 
such that the very existence of arbitration agreement is enough to give the arbitrator’s power to rule their 
own jurisdiction. In deed the UK courts in HC Trading Malta Ltd v Tradeland Commodities SL60 held that, 
‘disputes as to the existence or scope of the arbitration agreement should be determined by the 
detailed provisions of the Act (AA 1996), and in particular, as a starting point, (by doctrine of 
competence-competence under) s.30 (of the AA 1996).’61 
This broad approach adopted by the Kenyan court and English courts can be compared to the narrow 
approach adopted by the USA courts.62  The US courts will only recognise the doctrine of competence-
competence where there is ‘clear and unmistakable evidence’ that the parties agreed that arbitrators should 
determine arbitrability.63 It follows therefore an arbitration agreement is not enough there must be clear 
evidence that parties agreed that the arbitrator’s should decide arbitrability. For instance in First Options of 
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan64 despite an arbitration agreement, the US Supreme court held that Kaplan  
‘did not clearly agree to submit the question of arbitrability to arbitration… (and thus) it was subject to 
independent review by the courts.65The US Supreme court justified this approach on the grounds that 
without such a requirement the US courts ‘might too often force unwilling parties to arbitrate a 
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This means therefore in the USA where there are questions as to the validity of the arbitration agreement it 
should be resolved first by the courts unless there is clear unmistakeable evidence of an agreement to submit 
the arbitrability question to arbitration.67 
In this way therefore, in relation to the doctrine of competence-competence the Kenyan courts have taken a 
broad approach which similar to that taken by the English courts in contrast to the narrow approach taken by 
the USA courts. This approach by the Kenyan courts is promotes arbitration as it seeks to allow flexibility in 
arbitration practice and give the arbitrators in Kenya more freedom to rule on their own jurisdiction. 
Stay of proceedings in Kenya 
Where a party to an arbitration agreement commences court proceedings in breach of the arbitration 
agreement, the defendant can apply for the arbitration proceedings to be stayed via s.6 AA 1995. This is one of 
the main ways in which the Kenyan courts support arbitration. Through granting this remedy Kenyan courts 
recognise and apply the Scott v Avery68 principle that is, where there is a valid arbitration agreement, the 
parties are not at liberty to go to court unless they firstly go to arbitration (arbitration is a condition 
precedent).69 The rationale of this remedy is not only to enforce the voluntarily agreed forum of dispute 
resolution but also to prevent concurrent court and arbitration proceedings. Indeed, in Niazsons (K) Ltd v China 
Road and Bridge Corporation Kenya,70 Bosire J.A. held that: ‘the policy of the law, as I understand it, is that 
concurrent proceedings before two or more fora is disapproved.’  
Specifically, Section 6 of the Arbitration Act 1995 provides that: 
‘(1) A court before which proceedings are brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement 
shall, if a party so applies not later than the time when that party enters appearance or otherwise 
acknowledges the claim against which the stay of proceedings is sought, stay the proceedings and 
refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds: 
(a) That the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed; or 
(b) That there is not in fact any dispute between the parties with regards to the matters agreed to be 
referred to arbitration. 
(2) Proceedings before the court shall not be continued after an application under subsection (1) has 
been made and the matter remains undetermined.’ 
It is noteworthy that just as s.9 of the English AA 1996 on stay of proceedings, the Kenyan s.6 AA 1995 is 
modelled from Article 8 of the UNICITRAL model law and therefore they are fairly similar as discussed below. 
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It is noted that s.6 AA1995 sets out conditions that must be satisfied for the Kenyan courts to grant a stay 
proceeding to refer a dispute to arbitration where a party has started court proceedings in breach of an 
arbitration agreement. These are, firstly the defendant should not acknowledge a court claim and should make 
an application to stay the proceedings at time of first court appearance. Secondly, there must be a valid 
arbitration agreement operative and capable to be performed. Thirdly, there must a dispute to between the 
parties that is covered by the arbitration agreement and capable to be resolved by arbitration. The Kenyan 
courts have held that the purpose of that condition is to regulate and facilitate the realization of the 
constitutional objective of promoting alternative dispute resolution as well as ensuring justice.71 This assertion 
was emphasized and upheld in Eunice Soko Mlagui v Parmar & 4 others72 as stated below: 
‘The provision, for example, of section 6 which require parties  to make an application for referral of a 
dispute to arbitration at the earliest opportunity and before taking any other action, or those that 
require the court not to refer a dispute to arbitration if the arbitration agreement is null and void, or 
is incapable of being performed, or if there is no dispute capable of being referred to arbitration, 
cannot be described as inconsistent with the constitutional principle of promoting alternative dispute 
resolution because the court is also obliged to take into account the equally important  constitutional 
principle that justice shall not be delayed, by for example sending to arbitration a non- existent 
dispute, or allowing a party who has otherwise elected to pursue proceedings in the court, to  
belatedly purport to opt for arbitration.’73 
It is noted that s.6 AA 1995 just as English s.9 AA 1995 is written with mandatory and/or commanding terms 
with particular emphasis on the use of the word ‘shall’ therein. In this way therefore, the section restricts the 
Kenyan court’s discretion to decline or approve an application stay of proceedings in favour of arbitration 
based on whether the conditions set out are satisfied. Judge Numbuye at the Kenyan Court of Appeal in 
Achells Kenya Limited v Phillips Medical Systems Nederland B.V. Diederik Zeven & another74 held that; ‘having 
complied with that Section then what is left is for this court to follow the command in the said proceedings 
which is to stay the proceedings’.  
 
S.6(1) Time of Application and Acknowledgement of court proceedings 
In accordance with s.6(1) AA 1995 an application of a stay of proceedings by the defendant must be made no 
later than when the party enters an appearance or otherwise acknowledges the claim against which the stay of 
proceedings is sought.75 Similarly, under English Law s.9(3) of the AA 1995, the defendant, who does not admit 
the court claim, must, if he wishes to seek a stay, file an acknowledgment of service usually stating an 
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intention to challenge the jurisdiction of the court within 14 days.76 The defendant must not take any other 
step in the proceedings, and the application for a stay form must state that he has not done so or otherwise 
demonstrate the same.77 There under both English and Kenyan law, a defendant making a step in the 
proceedings is an act that both invokes the jurisdiction of the court and that demonstrates the defendant’s 
election to allow the action to proceed. 
The implication of this provision is that arbitration agreement does not automatically oust jurisdiction of the 
court over the matter. This is because just as the English courts, the Kenyan courts will not decline to assume 
jurisdiction over a matter merely because of the existence of an arbitration agreement. Therefore, in practice 
where party to the arbitration agreement objects to arbitration proceedings in national courts, the other party 
to the arbitration agreement must strictly only apply for a stay in proceedings for dispute to be sent to 
arbitration. A failure to do so no later than when the party enters appearance, would result to the party 
forfeiting their arbitration agreement.78  
In Kenya, the TM AM Construction Group Africa v The Attorney General79 case neatly illustrates this. In that 
case, the claimant commenced court proceedings against the Attorney General on the 21st February of 2001. 
The Attorney General entered appearance to those court proceedings on the 15th March 2001 however, made 
application via s.6 AA 1995 on the 25th April 2001 to stay the proceedings such that the dispute be referred to 
Arbitration. The court held that, since the Attorney General had made application 41 days after making 
appearance he had lost the right to rely on the arbitration agreement.  
The Kenyan courts have strictly adopted the time limitations within the AA 1995 (including s. 6) and the 
rationale for this was given in Nancy Nyamira & Another v Archer Dramond Morgan Ltd,80 where the Judge 
J.M. Ngugi held that: 
‘...Given the objectives of the Arbitration Act stated above, it is important that Courts enforce the time 
limits articulated in that Act – otherwise Courts would be used by parties to underwrite the 
undermining of the objectives of the Act‘.81 
 
s.6(1)(a) Arbitration agreement is valid operative and can be performed 
Also in accordance with s.6(1)(a) of the AA 1995 a party applying for stay of proceedings must  satisfy the 
court that, the arbitration agreement is valid. Thus if the arbitration agreement is null and void the Kenyan 
courts would not have the jurisdiction to issue a stay of proceedings.  
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This is similar to the s.9(4) of the English AA 1996 which manadates the English courts to grant a stay of 
proceedings unless satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being 
performed. In Downing v Al Tameer Establishment & Anor82 the English Court of Appeal Potter LJ held that ‘The 
burden of proving that any of the grounds in s. 9(4) has been made out lies upon the claimant and, if the 
defendant can raise an arguable case in favour of validity, a stay should be granted’83 
So it is clear therefore that Under English law, here the burden shifts to the claimant. In other words, the party 
seeking the stay of proceedings does not bear the burden of proof but only need to raise an arguable case in 
favour of validity for a to satisfy this section.84 
In Kenya, as mentioned above s.3 & s.4 of the AA 1995 define an arbitration agreement and set out the 
formality respectively. Thus arbitration agreement would only be considered as valid if it complies with those 
sections. It has also been mentioned that separability of the arbitration agreement is vital to the arbitration 
process and thus it follows that the validity of arbitration agreement would only be considered separately and 
independently. 
However, there are number of instances where the Kenyan courts have declared the arbitration agreement to 
be invalid. The rationale is that to stay proceeding where there is no valid arbitration agreement would 
otherwise amount to subjecting the parties to a forum of dispute resolution that they did not consent to. In 
practice, the applicant of the stay in proceedings will usually have already made advancements to initiate 
arbitration.85  
Moreover, there are number of instances where the Kenyan courts have held although the arbitration 
agreement is valid it is inoperative or incapable of being performed. For instance in cases where, as discussed 
above a party has participated in court proceedings instead of applying for stay of arbitration proceeding as 
was in the case in Peter Muema Kahoro & another v Benson Maina Githethuki.86 In that case, the court held 
that because the defendant had filled grounds of defence and actively taken other steps of defence in relation 
to court claim made by the defendant in breach of a valid arbitration agreement, the defendant had lost his 
right to rely on the arbitration agreement. 
 
S.6(1)(b) AA1995: Is there an existing arbitrable dispute between the parties? 
S.6(1)(b) AA 1995 requires there to be an existing dispute between the parties that is covered by the valid 
arbitration agreement before the courts to issue a stay in proceedings.  
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Here as is the case in English law to via s.9(1) AA 1995, the court has only to consider whether there is a 
dispute within the meaning of the arbitration agreement, not whether in fact there is a dispute between the 
parties. 
The English courts have interpreted a dispute for the purposes s.9(1) AA 1996 broadly. For instance, under 
English law, the fact that there is no arguable defence to a claim does not mean that there is no dispute. 
Evidently Savile J held in Hayter v. Nelson87 that: 
‘Two men have an argument over who won the University Boat Race in a particular year. In ordinary 
language they have a dispute over whether it was Oxford or Cambridge. The fact that it can be easily 
and immediately demonstrated beyond any doubt that the one is right and the other is wrong does 
not and cannot mean that that dispute did not in fact exist’.88 
However, it should be noted that under English law, there is no dispute in this context if a claim is 
indisputable.89 Notwithstanding, claims to which there is no good defence, or which the respondent has made 
no effort to answer at all, would still fall to be regarded as arbitration.90 Interestingly, as per Langley J at the 
English High Court in Exfin Shipping (India) Ltd Mumbai v Tolani Shipping Co Ltd 91 dispute in this context also 
covers a situation where there is an admitted but unpaid claim. 
In contrast, in Kenya courts have taken a narrow approach. In accordance with Githu Muigai, in order for the 
applicant of the stay of proceedings to establish this, they must satisfy the court that a ‘genuine (arbitrable) 
controversy’ exists between the parties to which the parties intended to resolve by arbitration.92 Thus 
following Mbaluto J ruling in Tm Am Construction (Africa) Group vs Attorney General93 ‘a party who is wholly 
unable to produce the minutest evidence to support an allegation of (an arbitrable) dispute in a contract has 
absolutely no right to … seek a stay of proceedings.’94 
The contrast in approach in this context is neatly illustrated in the case of UAP Provincial Insurance Company 
Ltd (‘the Insurance Company’) v Michael John Beckett95 where Mr. Beckett lodged a claim with the insurance 
company with which he had taken out a comprehensive insurance policy which had arbitration clause, 
following the loss of his vehicle. After negotiations the insurance company agreed (with Mr Beckett) to settle 
the claim by a payment of Kenya Shillings Six Million. However, after two years the payment had not been 
honoured. Thus, Mr Beckett launched a court claim against the insurance company for the settlement 
payment to which the Insurance Company filed an application to stay the proceedings in favour of arbitration 
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relying on s.6 AA 1995. Having established that there is a valid arbitration agreement between the parties 
covering all the disputes from the insurance policy, the legal question before the Kenyan court was whether 
there was an actual dispute between the parties. The court dismissed the application for the stay of 
proceedings on the basis that there was no dispute between the parties. The court held that: 
‘….Where the parties have reached a settlement, there is nothing to be referred to arbitration. The 
parties in this case agreed to settle the claim for the specified sum of kshs 6 million. (Thus the 
differences, if any, were sorted out by the parties themselves). The upshot of all this is that I decline 
to stay the proceedings herein is there is nothing to be referred to arbitration.  There is no dispute 
between the parties.  All there is a plaintiff’s right to be paid as per the agreement and that has 
nothing to do with the policy document.’ 96 
Once it is established there is a dispute, there is a particular emphasis in Kenyan law for that dispute to be 
arbitrable. As there is no statutory provision on arbitrability, it is a matter decided on case to case basis. 
However it should be noted that most civil matters in Kenya are arbitrable but however there appears to be 
restrictive approach in towards the arbitration of mandatory laws as discussed below. 
Arbitration of mandatory laws in Kenya  
There is no statutory limit within the Kenyan AA 1995 on the use of arbitration to a particular subject matter. 
However, it is general practice that, by reference to Article 159 of the Kenyan Constitution, that the ends of 
justice must be met in while promoting arbitration. Therefore in determination of a subject matter is 
arbitrable, the Kenyan courts will usually consider whether the law will be applied equally to all persons with 
due regard to all procedural technicalities without delayed while promoting all principles of the Kenyan 
Constitution.  
Although the AA 1995 gives carte blanche to the application of arbitration the Kenyan Courts still have the 
power to challenge the arbitrability of a subject matter. Indeed in Bia Tosha Distributors Limited v Kenya 
Breweries Limited & 3 others97 Judge J.L. Onguto at the Kenyan High Court held that: 
‘Notwithstanding the principle of constitutional avoidance and settled dispute resolution forums, the 
court may, depending on how a dispute is framed, still decline to send the parties to another forum. It 
all depends on how the issue is laid before the court.’98 
In that case, the court declined the arbitrability of constitutional issues in particular the court held that: 
‘Purely constitutional issues [are within] the court’s jurisdiction rather than [an] agreed mode of 
dispute resolution. I … do not for a moment view it that the framers of our Constitution intended the 
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rights and obligations defined in our common law, in this regard, the right to freedom of contract, to 
be the only ones to continue to govern interpersonal relationships.’99 
In Nyamweya & another v. Riley Barasa Services Limited 100 the arbitrability of an employment contract was 
challenged before the Industrial Court. However, it should be noted that in this case, the court held that the 
arbitrability of employment contracts are in accordance with employment laws in Kenya. 
In Kenya there is also a general understanding that arbitration is not the appropriate medium for resolving 
criminal matters. This includes commercial disputes that may have been tainted by some criminal liability, for 
instance, where there are allegations of blatant corruption, fraud or bribery.101 
Similarly, it is well settled that in English law that the arbitrators do not have the power to convict a person of 
a criminal offence. However, as confirmed recently by the English Court of Appeal, in London Steam Ship 
Owners Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v Spain102, arbitrators have jurisdiction to find that a criminal offence 
has been committed for instance bribery or fraud. In that case Moore-Bick LJ held that:  
‘it was not disputed that in the ordinary way an arbitrator has jurisdiction to find facts which 
constitute a criminal offence (fraud being an all too common example) or that in an appropriate case 
an arbitrator also has jurisdiction to find that a criminal offence has been committed.’103 
Such approach is controversial particularly because it is not clear such a criminal offence must be proved in 
arbitration proceedings. It is not clear what burden of proof would be applied, whether this would be the usual 
criminal standard beyond reasonable doubt or the civil standard on the balance of probabilities.104 Also, due to 
privacy and confidentiality arbitration the arbitrator may not have all necessary in determining criminal liability 
as compared to the courts for instance, a jury or records of bad character.  
In relation to the enforcements of Kenyan competition laws, The Competition Authority of Kenya (hereinafter 
CAK ), is established under the s.7 of the Competition Act 2010.105 The CAK’s mandate is to enforce Kenyan 
competition laws with the objective of enhancing the welfare of businesses in Kenya by promoting and 
protecting effective competition in markets and preventing misleading market conduct throughout Kenya.106 
There is yet to be arbitration of a competition law dispute issue in Kenya. 
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In comparison in the UK and the USA some competition   laws are arbitrable, particularly laws on the abuse of 
dominant position.107 For instance in ET Plus Sa v Welter 108 Justice Gross at the UK High Court held that, ‘there 
is no realistic doubt that competition laws… are arbitrable.’ 109 Similarly, in Mitsubishi110 Case, the USA 
Supreme court held that anti-trust (competition law) disputes could be resolved via arbitration as the parties 
agreed.111 However, it should be noted that USA courts adopted a second look doctrine in such a way the 
arbitrators are expected resolve the dispute in a manner that will ensure that the US Supreme Court will be 
satisfied with the final award, for award to be effective. 
In general, although as mentioned above there are no restrictions on AA 1995, in practice in Kenya there is a 
restrictive approach towards the arbitration of mandatory laws such as criminal, insolvency, bankruptcy, 
divorce and tax matters. The main issue with regards arbitration of such laws is that they are usually 
considered to fall outside the scope of an arbitration tribunal as they are considered to be matters of public 
policy. That is such laws are usually considered as involving sensitive issues of national interest which have a 
strong public policy for them to be applied uniformly and equally and thus must be settled by national courts 
as opposed to privately using arbitration.  
As it is recognised and acknowledged in both the USA and the UK, public policy is an elusive concept which is 
very difficult to define exhaustively. The Kenyan courts have also accepted this assertion, as seen in Anne 
Hinga v Victoria Gathara112 where it was held that: 
‘Public policy can never be defined exhaustively and should be approached with extreme caution, 
failure of recognition on the ground of public policy would involve some element of illegality or that it 
would be injurious to the public good or would be wholly offensive to the ordinary reasonable and 
fully informed member of the public on whose behalf the State's powers are exercised.’113 
It is clear therefore, as compared to other countries, there a restrictive approach in Kenya as to the arbitration 
of mandatory law. It follows therefore as Kenya is a signatory to the Article III New York Convention 1958, it is 
likely that the Kenyan courts would not recognise arbitration award on a subject matter to which is not 
arbitrable under Kenyan laws as being contrary to Kenyan Public policy via s.35 AA 1995.  
With regards to the arbitration of mandatory laws the survey asked the respondents whether mandatory laws 
including competition laws should be arbitrable in Kenya.  
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71.5% of the respondents indicated that they should not be owing to that the fact that there is an important 
public policy in the enforcement of mandatory laws to ensure they applied equally and uniformly (see below). 
One of the respondents wrote that mandatory laws should not be arbitrated because they involve more than 
the contracting parties. Indeed, this is usually the case in mandatory laws such as competition laws where 
there is usually a class action and consumer interest or criminal law where there is general public interest of 
justice to be administered. Another respondent indicated that Kenya is not yet ready for the arbitration of 
complex mandatory laws. They wrote:  
‘Commercial arbitration has traditionally been in construction engineering projects and financial 
matters. Disputes involving mandatory laws such as a competition laws have inbuilt procedures for 
solving disputes. Given the fact that the Nairobi Centre of Arbitration is hardly 3 years old it is 
advisable to gain expertise in the traditional areas before delving into new areas.’ 
Whether the UK and USA jurisprudence will be adopted in Kenya is yet to be seen but for now as indicated by 
the survey results there appears to be no appetite for the arbitration of mandatory laws in Kenya. 
Anti-suit injunctions in Kenya 
Anti-suit injunctions are often sought in national courts to restrain foreign proceedings in favour of arbitration. 
As arbitration is increasingly becoming the preferred method of dispute resolution internationally, so is the 
issuance of anti-suit injunctions. For instance, despite there being very few anti-suit injunction cases in New 
Zealand, Robertson J in Jonmer Inc v Maltexo Ltd114 held that that there was "no question that the [New 
Zealand] Court has the jurisdiction to make such an order".115 In addition, the Canadian Supreme Court in 
Amchem116 has acknowledged that Canadian courts have power to issue anti-suit injunctions but this should 
only be entertained when there is another more convenient and appropriate forum (forum conveniens test.) 
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Most recently, in 2015, the Hong Kong Court of First Instance in Ever Judger Holding Co Ltd v Kroman Celik 
Sanayii Anonim Sirketi117 issued its first anti-suit injunction in favour of arbitration proceedings by preventing a 
Turkish party from pursuing foreign court proceedings.  
 
Nevertheless, anti-suit injunctions are far from perfect. The central concern is the jurisdictional practicalities of 
issuing anti-suit injunctions. This is because although they are directed to the party in breach of the arbitration 
agreement, in practice it indirectly interference with the sovereignty and process of the foreign court.118 
Moreover, in practice it may be interpreted as the issuing court lacking of trust that the foreign court would 
submit the dispute to the appropriate forum.119 As result, different jurisdictions have adopted different 
approaches towards the issuance of anti-suit injunctions. The aim is to promote reciprocal trust between the 
national courts and avoiding or minimising the indirect interference or sovereignty of the foreign court. 
 
In the UK, the Senior courts have a "general power" to issue an anti-suit injunction under the UK s.37(1) Senior 
Courts Act 1981 in cases in which it appears to the court to be "convenient" to do so. However, they exercise 
this general power cautiously and "sensitively" in the arbitration context "with due regard for the scheme and 
terms" of the Arbitration Act 1996. 
 
However, in a controversial and extensively analysed case, West Tankers120 the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) held that the anti-suit injunctions of this nature run counter to the principle of mutual 
trust among the EU member states as required by the Brussels I Regulation (replaced by the Brussels Recast 
Regulation on 2015). As result, EU member state courts including the English courts, cannot issue an anti-suit 
injunction in favour of arbitration where a party starts foreign court proceedings in an EU state. However, with 
Brexit looming the ECJ will no longer have jurisdiction over UK courts and thus it is yet to be seen is whether 
the English courts will still favour this approach post-Brexit.121 
 
It must be emphasised that the limitation on English court to grant anti-suit injunctions from the CJEU decision 
in West Tankers case is only limited to the jurisdiction of Brussels Recast, that is where the foreign court is 
governed and regulated by the Brussels Recast. This has been neatly illustrated in the Ust-Kamenogorsk 
Hydropower Plant JSC v AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LLP122 case. In that case the UK Supreme 
Court issued an anti-suit injunction to prevent JSC from continuing with court proceedings in Kazakistan in 
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breach of a valid arbitration agreement. In deed in this case court referred to West Tankers limitation as 
irrelevant in this context. 
Notwithstanding, the civil law countries have adopted a similar approach to that of the CJEU in West Tankers.  
So for instance, German courts would neither issue an anti-suit injunction nor recognize nor serve foreign anti-
suit injunctions. This is primarily because anti-suit injunctions ‘indirectly’ interfere with the foreign court 
jurisdiction. This is neatly illustrated in the Re enforcement of the English anti-suit injunction123  where the 
Court of Appeal in Germany refused to serve an anti-suit injunction that UK High court had issued directed to a 
German party from proceeding with court proceeding in the German Courts. The German courts emphasised 
the fact that the anti-suit injunction are not directed directly to the German state or to the German courts is 
immaterial. This is because the anti-suit injunction has the effect of infringing the sovereignty of the German 
courts and thus refused to comply with the anti-suit injunction under Article 13 of the Hague Service 
Convention.124 Similarly, a Belgium Civil Court held that an anti-suit injunction that was issued by an American 
court could not be recognised in Belgium because it was repugnant to Belgium public policy and contrary to 
the right to fair trial under Article 6 the European Convention on Human Rights.125   
The US courts make reference to the principle of international comity. This binds the US courts to respect 
foreign court proceedings out of mutuality and respect. It creates an atmosphere of cooperation and 
reciprocity between the US and foreign courts in this modern era of economic interdependence.126 Therefore 
just as anti-suit injunctions run counter to the principle of mutual trust in the EU context (see above), they also 
run counter to the principle of international comity. This principle, therefore, ordinarily requires US courts 
when determining whether to issue of anti-suit injunction, it dictates US courts to balance between the public 
policies of the domestic and foreign sovereigns. In doing this the US courts are split in three on the appropriate 
weight that should be placed on international comity. 
The Fifth, Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits adopt a liberal approach and place more weight on the need to 
provide a remedy that avoids the inconveniences and inequities that simultaneous prosecution of the same 
action in foreign court may otherwise entail.127  Although under this approach, anti-suit injunctions are granted 
‘sparingly’128it places an undesirable low weight on international comity. 
The District of Columbia, Third, Sixth and Eighth Circuit adopt a conservative approach that accords more 
weight on non-interference with the sovereignty of the foreign court over the inconveniences of simultaneous 
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parallel proceedings.129 This is because an anti-suit injunction may affect the economic relations between the 
two countries and/or the foreign court may in-turn refuse to give effect to the US court judgment.130 
Thus, under this approach, an anti-suit injunction would only be granted if two conditions are met. First, where 
a foreign court proceeding would be evading important US public policies. For example, where a party seeks to 
elude a statute relating to the dispute.131 Second, where a foreign court action threatens appropriate 
jurisdiction. Such a case would be, for example, where there is evidence that the court may issue an anti-
arbitration injunction or not refer case towards arbitration. However, this approach is too rigid as anti-suit 
injunctions would be granted only where these two requirements are met.132 
 
The first and the Second Circuit courts adopt an intermediate approach. Under this pragmatic approach, these 
courts adopt a rebuttable presumption against the issuance of issue anti-suit injunctions. This presumption can 
be rebutted evidence showing that the totality of the facts/circumstances, weighs in favour of issuing an anti-
suit injunction.133 The factors considered include, inter alia, the importance of the policies at stake in the 
litigation and the extent to which the foreign action has the potential to undermine the arbitration process. 
 
In summary there are six distinct approaches towards the issuance of anti-suit injunctions as shown below: 
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The Kenyan courts have not yet issued such an anti-suit injunction to restrict foreign courts from commencing 
proceedings in a foreign court. The most familiar remedy to anti-suit injunctions issued by the Kenyan courts 
with regards such circumstances where a party has breached the arbitration agreement by starting court 
proceedings, is stay of proceedings under s.6 of the AA 1995 (discussed above). However, as mentioned above 
stay of proceedings is different in nature and would not be available in such a situation because, it is only 
available as a defence remedy and can only be relied upon in the court which the court proceedings have been 
started. 
Despite the fact the Kenyan courts have not yet issued an anti-suit injunction it is not inconceivable that the 
Kenyan courts would in the near future grant an anti-suit injunction in favour of arbitration. This is because in 
Kenya there is strong public policy in favour of enforcing arbitration agreements drawn from broad approach 
to doctrine of competence-competence and Kenyan signatory and commitment to uphold all principles of the 
 
 
New York Convention 1958 and the Article 159 of the Kenyan Constitution 2010 which mandates and exhorts 
the Kenyan courts to encourage arbitration. Moreover, being a common law country with legal system heavily 
influenced by the UK and USA legal jurisprudence which their courts have a well-established framework of 
issuing and recognising anti-suit injunctions.  
This being the case, the survey questionnaire (discussed above) asked respondents whether they would 
welcome this remedy. Out of the 144 respondents 73% of the respondents indicated that the Kenyan national 
courts should have the power to issue anti-suit injunctions as illustrated in the pie chart below. 
 
As a result the survey asked the Kenyan based respondents whether they would welcome this remedy, anti-




73% of the respondents indicated that the Kenyan national courts should have the power to issue anti-suit 
injunctions.  In support of this remedy one respondent wrote; 
 ‘Once parties voluntarily chose to enter into a valid arbitration agreement, they should be held to their 
bargain, irrespective of the jurisdiction.’  
Others wrote, the Kenyan courts should have this power because it ‘protects the sanctity of the arbitration 
agreement and is consistent with the parties’ agreement at the point of contracting.’  
In addition to this another respondent wrote,  
 
 
‘this equitable remedy should be availed to the aggrieved party and also to ensure that foreign courts 
recognize and respect the will of the parties expressed in the arbitration agreement.’  
These views were shared among the majority of the respondents. They are pro-arbitration responses in that 
they focus on the impact of this remedy on international arbitration practice. They indicate that on the 
respondents’ view an anti-suit injunction is an important remedy which has an effect of ensuring that the 
parties would be bound by their voluntary and consensual agreement to arbitrate the dispute. In this way 
therefore, it avoids a situation where the parties will abuse of justice in that parties reaching their voluntary 
and consensual arbitration agreement without any suitable remedy. In practice this is desirable because, 
creates certainty such that it gives reassurance to commercial parties that where there is a valid arbitration 
agreement the courts will bind the parties to that agreement. Other views advanced by the respondents in 
support of the remedy include: 
1. ‘Parties entered into contract with an arbitration clause for the express purposes of avoiding court 
proceedings. A court should not step in to determine rights of parties once they have agreed upon the 
method of settling disputes arising from the contract.’ 
2. ‘This will encourage parties to respect their arbitration agreements and will reduce forum shopping’ 
3. ‘If there is a valid arbitration agreement then proceedings should not commence in another 
jurisdiction as having two matters with the same parties simultaneously is repetitive and not in the 
interest of justice’ 
4. ‘This will lead to the matter being heard and determined expeditiously’ 
 
The other 27% of the respondents, who suggested that the Kenyan courts should not have the power of to 
grant anti-suit injunctions, were mainly concerned about the enforceability of such an injunction in the foreign 
court and that this remedy indirectly interferes with foreign court proceedings.  Expressing this concern one of 
the respondents wrote that: 
‘there would be, serious enforceability concerns if such injunctions are issued. I do not see how the 
Kenyan issued court injunction could be enforced in the foreign court in which there foreign court 
proceedings. Such orders would also impinge on the sovereignty of states whose courts are hearing 
such matters.’  
Others wrote: 
1. ‘I think that this would usurp the power of the foreign court. If a suit has been filed in a foreign 
court then it would be upon the Defendant to point to that foreign court that there is an 
arbitration clause in the agreement and that the matter should be referred to arbitration. Also it 
may be difficult to enforce such orders in foreign countries especially those in which Kenya has a 
strained relationship with.’ 
 
 
2. ‘There will be extreme difficulty in enforcing such injunctive orders upon a foreign Court. How will 
parties ensure compliance with the said orders?’ 
 
In order to respond to these concerns, it is important to understand the nature of such a remedy and how it 
has been justified in other jurisdictions with an already existing legal framework on anti-suit injunctions. 
In the UK House of Lords, Lord Hobhouse in Turner v Grovit134 explained that the term ‘anti-suit injunction’ is 
misleading because it gives the impression that it is directed towards the foreign court. Far from this, his 
lordship explain that, the injunction is not directed against the foreign court but rather, the order is directed 
against and binds the party who launches a wrongful claim in the foreign court.135 This is the case because this 
is an equitable remedy which is granted in personam which means, the court granting an anti-suit injunction is 
not interfering with the jurisdiction of the foreign court, but rather, imposing restrictions on a party over who 
has commenced foreign proceedings in breach of a valid arbitration agreement. In practice, this can be 
evidenced by the fact that where a party does not comply with an anti-suit injunction, it will usually be 
considered a contempt of court under English law136 for which fines may be imposed on the party or other 
punishments including, inter alia, seizure of assets or even imprisonment.137  In this way, therefore, anti-suit 
injunctions can be seen as a personal remedy granted in respect of the arbitration agreement which has the 
effect of restraining a party to a contract from doing something that he has promised not to do. In this way 
therefore the claimant (the party seeking the anti-suit injunction) contractual right to have disputes settled by 
arbitration is enforced. This justification is also relied upon in other jurisdictions including by the Australian 
Court High Court in CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd138 where Brennan CJ held that ‘the jurisdiction to 
issue an anti-suit injunction is not directed against the foreign court but against the party who would invoke 
that Court’s jurisdiction.’139 
Being an equitable remedy it also means that for an anti-suit injunction to be effective it is only granted where 
the court granting the remedy has personal jurisdiction over the party starting foreign court proceedings. This 
is crucial because it ensures the issuing court can enforce of the anti-suit injunction. In practice, usually it is 
foreign party who commences foreign court proceedings in their own domestic courts. As per Lord Chief 
Justice Stone in International Shoe v State of Washington140 in such instances in the USA, the USA courts will 
usually have personal jurisdiction over the foreign parties that have ‘minimum contacts’ with the US so that 
the court proceedings do not offend the due process standard of ‘traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.’141 Minimum Contact in this case refers to where the parties has established its physical or 
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legal presence in the US or where it is an internet-based entity is actively conducting commercial activities in 
the US.142 
As a matter of English law, once the court has jurisdiction over the substance of the case, it has personal 
jurisdiction to make ancillary orders, including anti-suit injunctions towards the parties.143 In relation to having 
personal jurisdiction over the substance of the case, usually, the English Courts will have jurisdiction over a 
dispute relating to a contract if the obligation which is subject to the dispute was to be performed in the UK. 
So for instance, For instance in U&M Mining Zambia Ltd (UCM) v Konkola Copper Mines Plc144 Blair J held that 
based on the facts of the case, the English court did not have jurisdiction to issue an anti-suit injunction 
because:  
"[The] dispute [is] between two Zambian companies. It concerns the operation of a copper mine in 
Zambia … The matter is of national as well as local importance since, as I have been told, the mine 
contributes a substantial proportion of Zambia’s total GDP. So far as judicial assistance by way of 
interim measures pending the appointment of the arbitrators is required, in my view the natural 
forum for such proceedings is in Zambia, not in England."145  
 
It well settled therefore, the court granting an anti-suit injunction in favour of arbitration proceedings, is not 
interfering with the jurisdiction of the foreign court, but rather, imposing restrictions on a party (which 
voluntarily agreed) to over whom the court had jurisdiction. 
Conclusions  
International arbitration practice in Kenya is on the rise. This is particularly as a result of increase of 
international trade in Kenya which led Kenya into making a commitment to exhort the practice of arbitration in 
Kenya. This commitment can evidently been seen through the Kenya becoming a signatory to the New York 
Convention 1958 and adopting the robust national AA 1995 which is modelled around the UNICITRAL model 
Laws, specifically limits the Kenyan court’s interference of the arbitration process amended in 2010 to reflect 
modern arbitration practices. Moreover, for the first time  in 2010 the Kenyan courts are now specifically 
mandated and exhorted by the Kenyan Constitution to promote alternative methods of dispute resolution 
including arbitration. Kenya’s commitment  to promote arbitration in Kenya is further demonstrated by the 
establishment of the NCIA. 
In their role to support arbitration, the Kenyan courts will grant a stay of proceedings via s.6 AA 195 where a 
party has breached arbitration agreement by starting court proceedings in a Kenyan court. Although English 
Statutory law on stay of proceedings is also modelled from the Art. 8 of the UNICITRAL Model law, there 
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appears to be difference in a way the laws are interpreted with the Kenyan courts taking a narrower approach 
for instance within the definition of a dispute in this context.  
This restrictive approach is further evident in the arbitrability of matters within Kenyan laws. So for instance 
currently, constitutional, criminal, insolvency, bankruptcy and tax matters are not arbitrable. Indeed the survey 
findings show that, the status quo is that there appears to be no appetite to allow arbitration of mandatory 
laws in Kenya at this time. 
Where a party starts foreign court proceedings in a foreign court in breach of arbitration agreement, it is not 
clear whether the Kenyan courts would grant an anti-suit injunction as they have not up to date. It is argued 
that it is likely that they would issue such a remedy in an appropriate case mainly because it is common law 
country which is heavily influenced by USA and UK jurisprudence. In deed majority of the survey respondents 
indicated that they would welcome it, because for it enjoins parties to their voluntary and consensual 
agreement to arbitrate. 
With regards to arbitration practice in Kenya, there is unique interest in Kenya towards arbitration particularly 
due to the speed of the process. This unique as captures the backlog of cases of within the Kenyan courts 
which reduces the speed of dispute resolution. For the Kenyan arbitrators, it clear that arbitration practice is 
most valued characteristic for the parties when they are making their selection. 
Overall, international arbitration practice in Kenya is on the rise. The legal arbitration framework and 
establishment of the NCIA and the development of NCIA rules sets a good platform for the further 
development of this. In addition to this, the Kenyan courts have mainly taken a positive attitude in support of 
arbitration, however, it will be interesting to see if the Kenyan courts will take a more liberal approach in the 
future. 
